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Introduction 
The recent crisis in Japan, which combined tsu-
nami and technological events, shows that any 
crisis, especially those in developed and develop-
ing countries, is from here out a hybrid crisis, 
mixing natural factors and human/technological 
(NATECH). Faced with such dramatic events, 
which exceed any means available for emergency 
rescue service, it is necessary a) to remain pru-
dent and b) to prepare. One of the means for 
preparing is unquestionably training. However, 
here, undoubtedly there are important con-
straints: How to train, for example, while repro-
ducing vividly and realistically, an event? How to 
exceed the admittedly useful, although very lim-
ited, level of the table-top exercise? How also to 
avoid the unnecessary mobilization of dozens, 
even hundreds, of field and operation staffers to 
take part in an exercise which could lead to a dis-
appointing outcome? A major crisis, a major ex-
ercise, in effect. The solution of virtual reality 
has emerged, in Europe and in the United States. 
It is also sometimes called “serious game”. 
Serious games, or “game-learning”, are designed 
with the main purpose to train, investigate, or 
communicate. The term "serious game" is not 
new. Clark Abt discussed the idea and used the 
term in his 1970 book Serious Games1. In that 
book, his references were primarily to the use of 
board and card games. However, he gave a use-
ful general definition which is still considered 
applicable in the computer age: “Reduced to its 
formal essence, a game is an activity among two 
or more independent decision-makers seeking to 
achieve their objectives in some limiting context. 
A more conventional definition would say that a 
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game is a context with rules among adversaries 
trying to win objectives. We are concerned with 
serious games in the sense that these games have 
an explicit and carefully thought-out educational 
purpose and are not intended to be played pri-
marily for amusement.” Earlier, officers have 
been using war games in order to train strategic 
skills for a long time (Kriegspiel).  Mike Zyda 
provided an update and a logical approach to the 
term in his 2005 article in IEEE Computer enti-
tled, "From Visual Simulation to Virtual Reality 
to Games". For him, serious Game is "a mental 
contest, played with a computer in accordance 
with specific rules that uses entertainment to 
further government or corporate training, educa-
tion, health, public policy, and strategic commu-
nication objectives."2 
 
When culture matters 
Initiatives and other pilot programs have been 
developed for a number of years in Europe and 
in the US. Thus, the American and French fire 
fighting schools - Emmitsburg,3 the US national 
fire school, ENSOSP4 (which trains all French 
fire fighters) (École Nationale Supérieure des 
Officiers de Sapeurs-Pompiers) and ECASC5 
(ÉCole d’Application de Sécurité Civile de 
Valabre) (specializing in the fight against wild-
fires) each layout different types of serious game 
for firefighters. For the first time, a Franco-
American exercise took place in France. On De-
cember 8, 2008, an American team from the 
NIMO TEAM, directed by Commander George 
Custer, took part in a Franco-American experi-
mentation on a simulator of wildfires. In the 
end, the two teams adopted rather similar tac-
tics, even if the positioning of the materials of 
rescue on the ground appears to have been a lit-
tle different. But overall, a cultural difference in 
measure, according to the observers, came to 
light - the Americans looked to apply their rules 
of engagement to the crisis, while the French fire 
fighters sought to deduce their rules of engage-
ment from the crisis itself. 
It is true that the stakes are important: Emmits-
burg has chosen techniques and teaching meth-
ods more founded on the standardization of 
practice, while ENSOSP seems to focus more on 
the adaptability of professional behavior to 
evolving situations. Another American product 
exists: Hazmat: Hotzone. It is an instructor-
based simulation that uses video game technol-
ogy to train first responders about how to re-
spond to hazardous material emergencies. 
Hazmat: Hotzone is currently in development at 
the Entertainment Technology Center at Univer-
sity Carnegie Mellon in collaboration with the 
Fire Department of New York.7 This software 
uses a scenario generator which makes it possi-
ble to configure and automate situations. A 
maximum exploitation of this approach is the 
configuration of decisional trees. This last ap-
proach, although it has some advantages (in par-
ticular, particular assessing the level of the  
players), also has several disadvantages: it can-
not measure innovation, spontaneity or adapta-
bility. 
 
(© SDIS 13)6 
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However, all in all, the objectives are the same 
ones: 
 
Common Objectives 
 
Decision makers training and communi-
ties of practice (CoPs) 
Operational situations are often characterized by 
their kinetics and their magnitude (and by exten-
sion the severity of the effects). The more these 
two factors will be important, the more control-
ling events will be a serious challenge. Both a 
kinetic and large event, the radioactivity leaks in 
Japan have shown their short-term effects, in-
cluding panic, even if the Japanese population 
(Screenshot: Hazmat: Hotzone©) 
seemed to be remarkably calm and rational. In 
the Japanese case and in general, first respond-
ers and decision makers, more particularly, de-
ploy the following responses to impose control:  
 - Analysis of the situation to understand 
what has occurred and what may occur;  
 - Evaluation of the stakes to analyze what 
may be impacted;  
 - Definition of the objectives, the prioriti-
zation of action and not unnecessarily 
“dispersing” resources, which, by definition, are 
initially limited;  
 - Control of results obtained for adapting 
the plan;  
 - And generally, sequencing. 
Some technical definitions: 
An avatar is a computer generated 3D character that represents the player, and that the player can 
move,  
A Non-player character (NPC) is a 3D character controlled by the computer,  
Terrain is the landscape that the characters move around in,  
A polygon is a collection of pixels that forms a small plane surface; many polygons are combined to 
create a typical complex surface.8   
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At the time of complex situations, these various 
phases require the implementation of decision-
making support units involving several actors, 
even possibly different services, in order to offer 
a wide spectrum of competence and to be able to 
divide the tasks. A crisis is characterized, in par-
ticular, by the failure of the decision-making 
process. If the decisions taken are incoherent, 
unsuited, and consequently ineffective, the event 
will completely suffer from the decision makers 
by a very negative feedback loop. The avoidance 
of crisis consists in the prevention of ending 
within such an outcome, often arising from the 
magnitude and the complexity of the initial 
event. It is thus crucial to train decision makers 
while placing them at “the razor's edge”, manag-
ing all the organizational, technical, and espe-
cially, human aspects of difficult circumstances, 
which are characterized by a context that can be 
strongly degraded by stress and uncertainty. 
 
Educational objectives repositioned on 
necessary competence 
Too often, training in the public or private sector 
conducted for the intervention into accidental 
situations remains theoretical (centered on 
“knowledge”). Exercises or scenarios carried out 
that consider the technical difficulties of organi-
zation but lack the realism of threatening effects, 
consequences of actions taken by the trainees, 
and conventions of exercise, make it only par-
tially possible to gain “know-how”. The lack of 
interactivity, relative to evolutions of a situation 
staged and defined in advance, does not allow 
working on a fundamental dimension relating to 
behavior, to capabilities of adaptation and initia-
tive taking initiative. New methods for creating 
training scenarios that rely on virtual reality 
tools allow simultaneously activity on these three 
completely complementary dimensions. Virtual 
reality enables a total interactivity between the 
trainees and a realistic shared representation, in 
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real time. They can thus follow the evolution and 
measure the effectiveness of their strategies of 
reaction. 
 
Different types of simulation and sce-
nario 
One can distinguish several types of exercise: 
 - Exercises of management which have the 
purpose to train, enhance or test the capabilities 
of the chain of command. It develops the strate-
gic as well as the tactical level. Charged to ana-
lyze, decide and inform, managers must show 
reactivity, anticipation and adaptation in a com-
plementary way; 
 - Practical exercises (or operations) which 
aim at training tactical operators. The perfect 
knowledge of the materials and equipment is 
essential. It is thus fundamental that the training 
permits a guaranteed control in the most realis-
tic possible context (actual tools, site used and 
context adapted); 
 - Global exercises which involve the two 
types previously cited – managers and operators. 
This type of exercise faces the limitations of the 
requirement for personnel engaged in providing 
daily coverage (actions of rescue for firefighters, 
public safety for the police force or national po-
lice) to remain on “the streets” for the duration 
of an exercise. Moreover, the participants acting 
as the population and victims in general do not 
adopt the attitudes - in particular, panic and the 
temporary lack of social norms - which can be 
anticipated or feared in a real situation. 
 
Virtual Operational Environments 
To meet the specific needs of civil security and 
defense, simulation tools were developed and are 
currently used for training fire fighters. The 
simulation of virtual operational environments is 
a solution which is as of now operational and 
which holds many advantages. Let's be clear on 
“simulation”: it does not consist of a simulation 
in the military approach, the handling of divi-
sional, regimental or infantry manpower, in a 
sophisticated counterpart of a “shoot and kill” 
video game, where the reflexes towards identify-
ing targets are paramount. The such military 
simulation are costly and undoubtedly out of 
proportion for any actor in civil security. Useful 
simulation for actors in civil security is a tech-
nology that is both easy and less expensive and 
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which is deployed on traditional computer plat-
forms through networked computers, allowing 
accurate reproduction of the operational context 
(virtual reality) and the command and decision 
making process (command tools, transmissions) 
in a continuously evolving and interactive con-
text: the concept of virtual operational environ-
ment. A virtual operational environment in-
cludes: 
 - A visually and auditory realistic depiction 
of the events, of the operational context, and 
their evolution in real time; 
 - Reproduction of the work environment 
(buildings, transmissions, decision making 
tools) usually present in a real context; 
 - A representation of the actions made or 
decided by the trainees, as well as the immediate 
impact of these decisions on the operational con-
text 
 - A stage-management team which ensures 
the coordination and the coherence of the exer-
cise (Play calls with trainees, telephone contacts, 
radio operator contacts…). 
The framework of reality thus created is ob-
tained by the presence of the actors involved in 
their own role in the midst of the action with ac-
curate reproduction of events, which includes 
aspects of domino effects (fluid flows of weather 
geography, and physicochemical characteristics 
of subduing substances), etc. In other words, the 
simulation is used to address the following con-
cerns: 
 - The operational ground, including the 
dimension of multi-agency; 
 - Complex event handling; 
 - And finally, the visualization of the ac-
tions and their effects in the operational context.  
Virtual reality allows pushing operational real-
ism further and makes it possible to confront 
participants with particularly credible and for-
mative virtual technical environments. 
 
By definition simulation helps to reproduce any-
thing: refineries, plants (creating an obvious ad-
ditional interest for companies, forests, trans-
portation networks, public places, and critical 
infrastructures. The possibilities are by defini-
tion infinite, which is obviously not the case with 
exercises “in reality” which are “life size”. It en-
sures a reproducibility of operational situations 
to develop a common culture among many ac-
tors in bringing them into an identical experi-
ment. The developed tools also contribute differ-
ent operations each time thanks to the software 
engines which determine the evolution of the 
disaster in real-time in accordance to the actions 
carried out by the users (total real-time interac-
tivity). 
 
Different types of exercises 
The system is used in various modes: 
 - Automatic: nothing is scripted, the sys-
tem calculates in real-time and posts the visuali-
zation of all the effects of the disaster and the 
evolutions as a result of the countermeasures 
taken by the actors. It consists of a very interest-
ing mode of function to ensure the training of 
seasoned teams or their evaluation at the end of 
the formation process: the system is the “Justice 
of the Peace” of the relevance/irrelevance of ac-
tions carried out in measuring the level of effec-
tiveness in real-time; 
 - Semi-automatic: the system proposes 
situation assessments, which are validated or not 
by the trainers' committee according to the level 
of expertise of the trainees. It is the operating 
process used in phases of formation for consoli-
dating competence; 
 - Manual: the trainers launch the visual 
representations according to a predefined initial 
stage. This operating mode is very useful for 
starting the training of new teams, and working 
on basic and systematic processes.  
The advantages of a standard platform of “civil 
security” simulation are numerous: 
 - Opportunity (interactivity and realism); 
 - Reversibility of effects (adaptability of the 
level of difficulty and situation); 
 - A potentially infinite number of events 
(domino effect); 
 - Multilevel crisis management and experi-
ence feedback; 
 - Communication. 
 
Simulation training can thus be adapted to many 
different levels of expertise. Application software 
adds further dimensions to the domino effect, 
which is calculated according to interfaces (for 
example, a leak on a chlorine tank will dynami-
cally be reproduced according to the characteris-
tics and proprieties of this product, the localiza-
tion of the tank, or external factors/pressures 
such as the wind). 
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Set up of exercises 
This consists in a mode of operation enabling the 
use of new tools. At first it is necessary to define 
the educational objectives in terms of adapted 
knowledge, know-how and behavioral skills 
(level of the trainees, initial formation or train-
ing), etc. The creation of an exercise forces the 
mastering of the first pedagogical constituent, 
but also in gaining sufficient expertise to develop 
operational topics and the various technical 
documents to be “as true as nature” as the train-
ees and the orchestrators will have need to use. 
This stage of design can be relatively significant 
in terms of time (counting ten to twenty hours of 
developing a four hour high level exercise). For 
example, an exercise for technical advisors last-
ing four hours: 
 - 0:30 hours of preliminary briefing for 
presenting the initial framework and conven-
tions of the exercise; 
 - 2:30 hours of effective work with the vir-
tual reality platform; 
 - 0:30 hours of debriefing by group; 
 - 0:30 hours of collective debriefing. 
 
Platforms developed for civil secu-
rity 
In order to illustrate the subject, two examples 
will be developed hereafter: 
The first relates to technological risks. It illus-
trates the capability to model and reproduce 
complex phenomena (explosions, fires, toxic 
clouds, effects of the thermal radiation, the flow 
of liquids…) and allows firefighters and industri-
als to work together by reproducing events of 
very great magnitude in relation to both indus-
trial sites at risk and accidents in the transporta-
tion of hazardous materials; 
The second is relative to formations for fighting 
wildfires because it illustrates the power these 
tools are capable of in reproducing the develop-
ment of fire encompassing large areas (several 
departments) in a very realistic way by using 
true visual representations of the terrain while 
also making it possible to engage jointly methods 
from the air and ground. 
It is advisable to mention that these platforms, 
located on two different sites are completely in-
teroperable. 
 
Technological risks and urban fires 
In 2004, ENSOSP set up a technological risk 
simulator especially designed for the training of 
technical advisers in chemical risks. This devel-
opment was carried out within the framework of 
a joint project supported by ENSOSP, and the 
US company Chevron-Oronite. Today, the Chev-
ron safety executives and firefighters work on 
the same tool and take part in common exercises 
and trainings. This simulator is also used to play 
out more social or sensitive themes (strike, ma-
levolent attack, terrorism).  
This joint approach makes sense: The effective-
ness of any action in extinguishing hydrocarbon 
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fires is largely conditioned by the coordination of 
the various resources of firefighting, (cannons 
and foam reserves) cannons and emulsifier re-
serves, etc. It is also associated with a good over-
view of the situation and phenomenon within its 
environment in order to prevent or minimize the 
risks of the domino effect. Virtual reality holds 
great educational richness for training actors 
about such complex scenarios. 
 
Wildfires 
ECASC originated the development of these new 
tools and since 2000 has been using a wildfire 
simulator to ensure the training of officers at the 
command of interventions of great magnitude. 
One of the most interesting aspects which have 
appeared is an increased interoperability be-
tween field responders and pilots, in the sense of 
an improved understanding of sometimes di-
verging and even contradicting perceptions and 
practices. 
The complexity of a simulation can sometimes 
be increased in detail, such as for example crowd 
simulation. 
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Approaches on the crowd simula-
tion for civil security 
The problem of the collection of relevant infor-
mation, i.e. usable by digital programming/
artificial intelligence, is banally tied to the defini-
tion which one gives to “crowd”: When can we 
regard a “crowd” as a concentration of individu-
als? Are the behavioral actions of a crowd a) ana-
lyzable and b) quantifiable or measurable? The 
obvious corollary is this: up to what point is it 
relevant and acceptable to proceed with simplifi-
cations in the representations of a “crowd”? Cer-
tain computing researchers have brought solu-
tions, which will probably seem “basic”, even 
simplistic, to specialists on collective mobiliza-
tion or sociologists, but which despite everything 
support some practical advances. The question 
here is not to provide the most perfect definition 
of “crowd”, but to allow useful concretizations. 
An inevitable simplification is acceptable if it 
permits useful uses. As an example, McPhain 
defines a gathering as a form of collective action 
where more than 2 agents are engaged in one or 
more fundamental actions (vertical/horizontal 
locomotion, orientation, vocalization, verbaliza-
tion gesticulation and/or handling of objects).9 
This approach appears adequate to us insofar as 
it is primarily functional. It does not seek to pro-
vide a typology of a crowd starting from its total 
description and/or its goal. In the same way, the 
formation of a group of individuals, their collec-
tive aggregation, is caused by a fundamental 
event. Schweingruber and McPhail propose cri-
teria of classification based on four different 
states or levels of density - from unrestricted 
passage to a difficulty in clearing. This classifica-
tion rests explicitly on the idea that a crowd is 
temporarily or permanently determined by the 
constraints of the environment where it is driven 
(if it is driven). It also seems to us that the obser-
vation of the field, in particular, the element 
“crowd control” justifies an approach of multiple 
interactions between actors who have different 
roles and interests, even divergent (police, me-
dia, passive passersby and observers), etc. It 
should be also admitted that a useful approach 
for civil security does not require regarding a 
crowd as a homogeneous whole, but to distin-
guish within it agents having an individual driv-
ing or gravitational behavior to other agents (for 
example, example the agent who would play an 
intermediary in the process of evacuation). Do-
ing that, our approach is distinguished conse-
quently from theoretical work on convergence, 
which postulates a crowd as a rational collective 
actor, with a defined common goal, etc. 
It seems on reflection, that the technological 
choices (in particular, specific softwares and 
modules of artificial intelligence) are narrowly 
determined by the final use of the designed 
product. What does one want to find? Does one 
want to develop simulations of evacuations of 
very big crowds, the type of a football stadium, 
or simulations of professional and organized 
crowds, beyond behavioral degradation caused 
by stress - evacuation type of a production line at 
a factory site? It is certain that common points 
are potentially observable, for example, between 
the evacuation of an industrial site and the 
evacuation of an offshore oil platform (the same 
rational and normalized manner of evacuation/
reaction?). On the other hand, on examination, 
the problems of maintaining order and crowd 
control seem a very complex issue to work out 
for a product made for operational frameworks 
of an intermediate level, the type for command-
ers/operational/team leaders. The principal dif-
ficulties indeed appear to be the definition of be-
haviors and individual agents who are both suffi-
ciently realistic and capable of having an involv-
ing or “aggregator” effect on semi-autonomous 
avatars. An additional difficulty would undoubt-
edly be the addition of culturally defined behav-
ioral attitudes (for example, example the devel-
opment of a Shia, German or Sub-Saharan Afri-
can crowd), etc. 
Many simulation models have been developed 
for evacuation management. They range from 
simple and procedural descriptive dimensions to 
complicated mathematical models. Moreover, 
some generate rather impressive detail, but only 
in direct proportion to the quantity of informa-
tion, which is appropriate to collect for an opti-
mal use of the model. The best is the enemy of 
the good in this case. The models of average 
complexity allow certain adaptability for its us-
ers, though they also are very demanding in re-
gard to the collection of preliminary data. South-
worth (1991) and Jamei (1984) carried out a sys-
tematic examination of the existing models: 
 
Macro-Models of Evacuation 
As an example, NETSIM (FHWA, 1995)10 is fa-
mous for its robustness, its consistency and its 
reliability, but the quantity of data which it re-
quires does not make it practical for a large 
population (about a few hundred). DYNEV 
(KLD, 1984)11  is the model (deterministic) most 
known for evacuation exercises. It was conceived 
as a view to the evacuation of populations 
around a nuclear plant and can generate results 
which “begin” to have an operational interest. It 
is, in particular, possible to exploit certain ex-
ogenous variables of this software. 
EVAC PLAN PACK Model is a model both pro-
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babilistic and dynamic12. In particular, it takes 
into account the congestion and obstruction of 
vehicles in a phase of evacuation.  
Other models could be cited here: EMME/213, 
TRAFL14, TRANSYT15, or UTPS16. The majority 
use an approach based on simulation. These 
here offer undeniable advantages as measured 
examples of mass evacuation are rare. They also 
permit to test certain situations in terms of con-
gestion, obstruction to flow, etc. In essence, 
models of dynamic management of traffic 
(Dynamic Traffic Management)17 are of comple-
mentary interest, especially if they provide the 
following characteristics: 
 - Human/response factors of the evacuees 
to alert messages,  
 - Network topology, so that convoys and 
evacuees can “find” the best trajectories, or the 
shortest and least congested, etc. 
However, not all these models appear to be able 
to be directly useful for fire fighters because the 
“focal range” is much too broad in regard to their 
needs. 
 
BDI Software and Virtual Reality 
More useful perspectives appear offered by soft-
ware of the type BDI (Belief-Desire-Intention) 
intended for the programming of “intelligent 
agents”, defined here as autonomous entities, 
which act/react and interact with the environ-
ment.18 The BDI model, developed by Bratman19, 
considers that intention and desire are active 
attitudes, but the intention is controlled by defi-
nition. The action is consequently, the difference 
between desire and intention, which leads to a 
temporal persistence of plans and/or the forma-
tion of subsequent plans/Phase +1. 
Ideally, a computer BDI agent will react accord-
ing to the following sequence: 
Initial state  
Repetition 
Options: Generator of options (events queue) 
1.  Selection of options: choice 
2.  Re-actualization of intentions (Options 
selected) 
3.  Execution 
4.  Arising of a new exterior event 
5.  Elimination of failed attitudes 
6.  Elimination of impossible attitudes  
End, repetition –retroactive loop. 
 
Apart from a moment of surprise or panic imme-
diately following the occurrence of an event, an 
evacuating population is regarded as rather ra-
tional and involved20. The fundamental criteria 
are the degree of preparation of the crowd, i.e. 
its capability to respond in an effective way (to 
save lives, to evacuate, to escape, altruism) or 
“ineffective” (panic, egoistic behavior, etc). A 
crowd of professionals, the type of personnel of a 
chemical plant, will be more organized, altruistic 
and prepared than a civil crowd (standard attack 
on an area or in the subway). On  the contrary, a 
“civil” or “by chance” crowd will be more in-
clined to spontaneously adopt reactive or in-
stinctive reflexes of escape, verily from panic, 
without direction (at least initially), even for the 
individuals who approach personal practical 
strategies quickly. 
Two levels can be distinguished here: 
 - The reactive level: quasi-immediate be-
havior in time which does not require reflection, 
a reflexive behavior (but complex as it is the re-
sult of education, culture, of the circumstances 
of the explosion and the terrain, etc.). By exam-
ple: avoidance between people, emotional reac-
tions (visible or not). 
There appear to be three possibilities: 
A competitive behavior is often observed in 
emergencies, when the individuals are in compe-
tition for their own chance of exiting (and of sur-
vival, if necessary): 
 
 
 
The competitive behavior in general induces to-
tal or partial dysfunction, or unsuitable collective 
behaviors. Collective behavior of competition 
occurs when the individual units (a) go in a haz-
ardous way until a goal is fixed, (b) seek a goal 
with a maximum rapidity and do not seek to ne-
gotiate with other agents, and (c) dos not seek to 
avoid collision (thus the individual cultural bub-
ble is close to zero). 
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On the other hand, a behavior of creating a 
queue can emerge spontaneously when crowd 
aggregates (a) in front of an exit and (b) when it 
is formed/informed/prepared/trained with pro-
cedures of evacuation. 
 
 
 
The behavior of creating a queue supports a fluid 
flow of the population. The formation of a queue 
largely appears a self-organized and conducted 
movement, not at congestion and very concen-
trated exit points, but at those with less conges-
tion or most likely none at all. A behavior of cre-
ating a queue occurs when the individual units 
go randomly until a goal is found (a), search for 
a goal (b) and (c) if prevented by other individu-
als from evacuating, “negotiate” to create a 
queue or join with an existing queue. Looked at 
another way, it is rather close to the phenome-
non of monitoring, as in ticket purchase or dem-
onstration. 
The fact of it is that it is often difficult to distin-
guish among the three levels of behavior. 
 
Conclusion 
In the end, we are witnessing a major change 
where firefighters are at the same time the main 
actors and recipients: simulations so that each 
day practiced makes it possible to work on large 
land-air scale scenarios (for wildfires, in particu-
lar), to improve multi-agency action/coope-
ration, to map out scenarios of events of great 
amplitude, to model past interventions, to place 
participants in the center of the action, to debrief 
stage by stage situations clearly in 3-D, and fi-
nally, to evaluate  tactical reasoning, the proce-
dures and the ideas of an operation. 
The currently developed platforms make it pos-
sible to reach a determining stage of formation 
from high decisional levels to that of the first re-
sponder by completely immersing trainees in the 
middle of the events. They feel the effects (visual 
and aural), the stress and thus can prepare effec-
tively. Technologies to share information re-
motely via the internet will also make it possible 
to plan the work of the trainees from different 
sites in order to minimize the logistical costs of 
displacement while preserving teaching aspects. 
The increase in exercises involving public actors, 
resulting from various operational and private 
services, is desirable in order to reinforce the 
synergy and quality of the preparations. 
A transatlantic approach on this subject, even 
simply Franco-American, would have many and 
substantial advantages: 
 - Joint training on transatlantic exercises 
of large scale (type Japan, Chernobyl, Katrina), 
 - Evaluation of respective practices 
(Lessons learned), 
 - Creation of communities of practice on 
an international scale, 
 - Standardization or reciprocal knowledge 
of the operational procedures and doctrines, 
In the short run, a transatlantic seminar on seri-
ous game and the civil security, associating ex-
perts, fire fighters and other potentially inter-
ested actors through education and training 
could allow the definition of the prospects and 
challenges in creating cooperation in this field.◊ 
Assertions and opinions in this paper are solely those 
of the author (s) and do not necessarily reflect the 
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the Atlantic on issues facing Europe and North 
America. The goal of the Center is to strengthen 
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cognized by the European Commission as one of a 
select number of EU Centers of Excellence in the 
United States. The Center also leads the internatio-
nal policy work of the Johns Hopkins-led National 
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